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David A. Felice 
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Wilmington, DE   19808 
          Counsel for Jeffrey M. Norman 
 
David W. Elkin 
805 Bryn Mawr Avenue 
Newtown Square, PA  19073 
          Pro Se 
_______________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
_______________ 
 
JORDAN, Circuit Judge. 
 
This appeal, the second we have been asked to decide in 
this case, marks what is, one hopes, effectively the final chapter 
of a bitter dispute spanning more than 14 years and involving 
state and federal courts, two different district court judges, two 
jury trials, and seemingly innumerable procedural and 
dispositive motions, both pre- and post-trial.  Pursuant to our 
mandate in the parties’ prior appeal, Norman v. Elkin, 860 F.3d 
111 (3d Cir. 2017) (“Norman V”), the District Court decided 
that the statute of limitations for all of plaintiff Jeffrey M. 
Norman’s claims, which include both contract and non-
contract causes of action, were tolled during the pendency of a 
books and records request he initiated in the Delaware Court 
of Chancery in November 2004 pursuant to § 220 of Title 8 of 
3 
 
the Delaware Code (the “§220 Action”).  Notwithstanding 
Norman’s entitlement to §220-based tolling, however, the 
Court also concluded that all but a subset of his breach of 
contract claim was time-barred because he knew or should 
have known the facts giving rise to those claims for longer than 
the applicable limitations period before filing the §220 Action.  
Both Norman and defendants David W. Elkin, The Elkin 
Group, Inc. (“TEG”), U.S. Mobilcomm, Inc. (“USM”), and 
Richard Shorin (collectively, the “Elkin Defendants”) now 
challenge multiple aspects of the District Court’s ruling.   
 
With one exception, we hold that the parties’ assertions 
of error by the District Court lack merit.  The single exception 
deals with Norman’s breach of contract claim based on events 
that occurred in May, July, and August of 2001.  We agree with 
Norman that the District Court incorrectly determined that 
those claims were untimely.  Accordingly, we will reverse that 
aspect of the District Court’s final judgment, affirm all others, 
and remand to the District Court for the limited purpose of 
entering a revised final judgment consistent with this decision. 
 
I. BACKGROUND1 
 
A. Factual Background 
 
Norman and Elkin founded USM in the early 1990s for 
the purpose of aggregating “Phase 1” 200 MHZ licenses issued 
 
1  We focus our statement of the factual and procedural 
background on those matters most pertinent to the parties’ 
present appeals.  Additional information can be found in 
Norman V, and the District Court’s numerous opinions 
throughout this case’s extensive history.  See Norman v. Elkin, 
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by the Federal Communications Commission (“FCC”).2  They 
orally agreed that Elkin would hold 75% of USM’s equity and 
Norman the other 25%.  Consistent with that ownership 
structure, they also agreed that, of the $1 million required to 
capitalize USM, Elkin would contribute $750,000 and Norman 
would contribute $250,000.  Norman’s role in USM was to 
acquire the initial licenses.  After he successfully did so, 
“Norman’s day-to-day involvement in USM ended[,]” and 
“Elkin continued to manage USM’s affairs.”  Norman VI, 338 
F. Supp. 3d at 369.  
 
 In 1998, the FCC announced it would auction “Phase 
II” licenses.  Elkin registered USM as a bidder in one such 
auction in which “USM won the rights to several Phase II 
licenses[.]”  Id.  Elkin subsequently transferred USM’s rights 
in the Phase II licenses to another company that he owned, 
TEG.  TEG’s involvement purportedly was necessary because 
USM did not have sufficient funds on its own to participate in 
 
No. CIV.A. 06-005-JJF, 2007 WL 2822798 (D. Del. Sept. 26, 
2007) (“Norman I”); Norman v. Elkin, 726 F. Supp. 2d 464 (D. 
Del. 2010) (“Norman II”); Norman v. Elkin, 849 F. Supp. 2d 
418 (D. Del. 2012); Norman v. Elkin, No. CV 06-005-LPS, 
2015 WL 4886049 (D. Del. Aug. 14, 2015); and Norman v. 
Elkin, 338 F. Supp. 3d 361 (D. Del. 2018) (“Norman VI”). 
 
2  “Phase I” licenses, which were distributed by lottery, 
were the “first wave” of licenses that covered particular radio 
frequencies in specified geographic areas.  Norman V, 860 F.3d 
at 116.  The FCC subsequently issued “Phase II” licenses 
“through a competitive auction.”  Id.  Some Phase II licenses 
overlapped, but were not coterminous, with previously issued 
Phase I licenses.    
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the auction and it was important to ensure that “a friendly 
corporation acquired the licenses that overlapped with those 
already owned by USM.”  Norman V, 860 F.3d at 116.  Norman 
closely monitored the auction and emailed Elkin requesting 
information on its outcome.  Elkin did not respond.  Id.  Some 
FCC notices relating to the auction listed USM as the winning 
bidder of Phase II licenses, while others referred to TEG as the 
owner of those same licenses.  Id. 
 
 At some unknown time between 1995 and 2002, Elkin 
caused USM to enter into a Shareholder Loan Agreement 
(“SLA”) with him.  Under the SLA, “USM agreed to treat any 
amount Elkin contributed above his capital requirement as a 
loan.”  Norman VI, 338 F. Supp. 3d at 369.  Elkin neither 
informed Norman about the SLA nor sought his approval for 
it, and purportedly lent USM in excess of $600,000 pursuant 
thereto.   
 
 In 2000 and 2001, USM started selling off its licenses.  
“Norman received federal income tax K-1 forms from USM 
for the tax years 2000 and 2001 that declared USM had realized 
a capital gain.”  Id. at 370.  “Those K-1 forms did not state what 
had been sold, and they did not list any shareholder loans or 
distributions. However, in a deposition, Norman admitted that 
a capital gain, by definition ... has to be sale of a license[.]”  
Norman V, 860 F.3d at 117 (quotations omitted and alterations 
in original).  In a series of distributions effectuated by Elkin 
from 2000 to 2002, USM paid Elkin $615,026 from the 
proceeds of the license sales.  Norman received nothing.   
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 After not hearing from Elkin “in ages,” (JA at 860,)3  
Norman called him in the summer of 2002 (the “Summer 2002 
Call”).  Norman testified that Elkin was “a little bit evasive” 
on the call, but admitted that licenses had been sold and that he 
(Elkin) had taken a distribution.  Norman V, 860 F.3d at 117.  
When Norman inquired why he (Norman) had not received any 
distributions, Elkin responded, “it wasn’t your turn.”  Id.  
Norman requested additional information, which Elkin never 
provided.   
 
Perhaps spurred by Elkin’s lack of cooperation, Norman 
had his attorney send Elkin a letter in October 2002 (the 
“October 2002 Letter”) requesting information regarding “the 
sale or other disposition of any assets or stock of [USM] over 
the past three (3) years, and the distribution or use of any 
proceeds of any such sales or dispositions.”  Id. (alteration in 
original).  Elkin responded by letter approximately two months 
later on December 3, 2002 (the “December 2002 Letter”), 
acknowledging that USM had sold the licenses “it owned,” but 
the letter included agreements revealing TEG had sold certain 
Phase II licenses.  Id.  “The letter also included a breakdown 
of the uses of the proceeds, including repayment of what were 
characterized as shareholder loans[.]”  Id.  In October 2003, 
USM responded to requests for further information by 
Norman’s attorney by sending him a letter (the “October 2003 
Letter”) that included a copy of the SLA.  Id.   
 
 
3  As used herein, references to “JA” are to the parties 
Joint Appendix filed in Norman V (case numbers 16-1924 and 
16-2164), which, by Order dated February 28, 2020, we 
permitted the parties to utilize in the present appeals.   
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B. Procedural Background 
 
Based on the information he had obtained over the prior 
two years, Norman filed the §220 Action on November 16, 
2004, which was resolved in Norman’s favor on October 2, 
2005.  Approximately two months later, Norman filed this 
lawsuit in the Delaware Court of Chancery, which the Elkin 
Defendants removed to the District Court.  In his complaint, 
“Norman raised a wide variety of tort and contract claims 
against [Defendants] including breach of contract, usurpation 
of corporate opportunities, conversion, fraud, breach of 
fiduciary duties, and unjust enrichment.”  Norman V, 860 F.3d 
at 118. 
 
 In May 2009, three of Norman’s claims –  breach of 
contract, fraud, and conversion – were tried to a jury.  The jury 
returned a verdict for him on all counts.  Elkin moved for 
judgment as a matter of law on the ground that Norman’s 
claims were time-barred.  The District Court largely agreed, 
and held Norman’s claims were untimely except those based 
on two breach-of-contract theories: that Elkin breached his oral 
agreement with Norman regarding USM’s capitalization by 
executing the SLA and by failing to make pro rata 
distributions of the license sale proceeds.     
 
 After further motions by both Norman and Elkin, the 
District Court held a second jury trial on Norman’s two 
remaining claims. “The jury again found in Norman’s favor 
and awarded him $1 in nominal damages based on Elkin’s 
execution of the SLA and $73,180.17 in compensatory 
damages for Elkin’s failure to make pro rata distributions.”  
Norman VI, 338 F. Supp. 3d at 368.  The amount of damages 
awarded indicates that the jury considered a substantial portion 
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of the funds Elkin directed to himself between 2000 and 2002 
to be repayments of loans he made to USM, rather than 
distributions.   Elkin again moved for judgment as a matter of 
law, and again the District Court agreed.  Most significantly, 
the District Court held that the §220 Action did not toll the 
statute of limitations for any of Norman’s claims, rendering all 
of his claims untimely.  The Court vacated the jury’s verdict 
and entered final judgement in Elkin’s favor. 
 
 Both Norman and Elkin appealed.  Ultimately, we 
vacated the entry of judgment in Elkin’s favor, excepting the 
fraud claim.  We remanded the case to the District Court for 
two purposes: “(1) for the Court to reinstate the jury verdict 
and award of nominal damages for Norman’s SLA-based 
breach of contract claim and (2) for the Court to determine 
whether §220 tolling should apply to Norman’s claims, and, if 
so, whether Norman’s remaining claims are timely.” 4  Id.  
 
4  Surprisingly, Elkin asks us to overrule part of our 
earlier mandate based on the District Court’s conclusion on 
remand that Norman’s SLA-based breach of fiduciary claim, 
premised on the same facts as his SLA-based breach of contract 
claim, was time-barred.  In making such a request, Elkin 
ignores that he had a full and fair opportunity during the first 
appeal to challenge the SLA-based breach of contract claim as 
untimely, just as he did with the SLA-based breach of fiduciary 
duty claim, but failed to do so.  As we specifically noted in 
Norman V, that failure created a “confounding” situation in 
which “the statute of limitations might stand as a bar to the 
[breach of fiduciary duty claim] but not the [breach of contract 
claim].”  Norman V, 860 F.3d at 128.  The fact that the entirely 
foreseeable disparity we identified in Norman V came to 
fruition, a disparity that Elkin bears sole responsibility for, 
9 
 
 
On remand, the District Court, applying our guidance 
from Norman V, concluded that the statute of limitations for 
each of Norman’s claims was tolled during the pendency of the 
§220 Action.  The Court then proceeded to examine whether 
Norman’s claims nevertheless were untimely by assessing 
whether he had actual or inquiry notice of his claims within the 
applicable limitations period – three years for his contract 
claim and two years for his non-contract claims – before 
initiating the §220 Action.  Because two of the distributions 
that Elkin made to himself occurred in 2002, the Court held 
Norman’s breach of contract claim based on those distributions 
was timely, as it was made within three years of Norman 
bringing the §220 Action.  For each of Norman’s other claims, 
including breach of contract based on distributions that Elkin 
made to himself in May, July, and August of 2001, the Court 
held that Norman had at least inquiry notice of those claims 
beyond the applicable limitations period, and thus dismissed 
them as untimely.  Accordingly, the District Court entered 
judgment in Norman’s favor on his breach of contract claim 
premised on distributions made in 2002 and, per our mandate, 
his breach of contract claim based on the execution of the SLA, 
but in Elkin’s favor on all other claims.   
 
Both Norman and Elkin moved for reargument.  At the 
hearing on the motion, Elkin argued for the first time that 
Norman was not entitled to tolling relating to the §220 Action 
because he brought that action in bad faith.  Elkin attempted to 
introduce purported “evidence” of that bad faith, but the 
District Court refused to consider that new evidence and denied 
 
does not entitle him to any relief.  We reject Elkin’s request to 
revisit that, or any other, aspect of Norman V. 
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all motions for reargument.  Both Norman and Elkin timely 
appealed the final judgment. 
 
II. DISCUSSION5 
 
A. Elkin’s Appeal 
 
1. Tolling based on the §220 Action 
  
Elkin’s primary contention on appeal is that the District 
Court erred in concluding that the §220 Action tolled the 
 
5  This case was removed from the Delaware Court of 
Chancery to the District Court under 28 U.S.C. § 1441, on the 
basis of diversity jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). We have 
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. “We exercise 
plenary review of an order granting or denying a motion for 
judgment as a matter of law and apply the same standard as the 
district court.” Lightning Lube, Inc. v. Witco Corp., 4 F.3d 
1153,1166 (3d Cir. 1993) (citation omitted); cf. Lake v. 
Arnold, 232 F.3d 360, 365 (3d Cir. 2000) (“[P]lenary review 
extends to the District Court’s choice and interpretation of 
applicable tolling principles and its conclusion that the facts 
prevented a tolling of the statute of limitations.”). “[A]lthough 
the court draws all reasonable and logical inferences in the 
nonmovant’s favor, we must affirm an order granting judgment 
as a matter of law if, upon review of the record, it is apparent 
that the verdict is not supported by legally sufficient 
evidence.” Lightning Lube, Inc., 4 F.3d at 1166. As to Elkin’s 
sufficiency of the evidence arguments, we likewise “view[ ] 
the evidence in the light most favorable to [Norman]” and will 
affirm the District Court only if there “is insufficient evidence 
from which a jury reasonably could find liability [against 
11 
 
statute of limitations for Norman’s claims.  In support of that 
position, he advances several arguments, each of which fails.  
First, he makes an “order of operations” argument – that the 
District Court improperly decided the issue of §220-based 
tolling before determining if, and when, Norman had inquiry 
notice of each of his claims.  But the order in which the District 
Court chose to address those discrete issues is irrelevant.6  It is 
neither incorrect nor inherently inconsistent for a court to first 
determine that the statute of limitations for a claim should be 
tolled based on a successful §220 action but that the claim 
nevertheless is untimely because the plaintiff had actual or 
inquiry notice of his injury sufficiently in advance of that §220 
action.  To the extent the District Court utilized that approach 
on remand, it did not err in doing so, even if it took what might 
be a more circuitous route to resolution. 
 
 Second, Elkin says that Norman is not entitled to §220-
based tolling because of Norman’s “complete lack of inquiry” 
 
Elkin].” Id.  Finally, “[w]e review admissibility 
determinations, and exclusion of evidence for an abuse of 
discretion.” Quinn v. Consol. Freightways Corp. of Del., 283 
F.3d 572, 576 (3d Cir. 2002). 
   
6  In that regard, Elkin appears to have misunderstood 
our instruction in Norman V for the District Court to determine 
“in the first instance” when Norman had inquiry notice of his 
claims.  Norman V, 860 F.3d 127.  The purpose of that 
instruction was not to dictate the structure of the District 
Court’s opinion on remand, but rather, as the Court properly 
recognized, was to ensure that the District Court would be the 
first tribunal to decide that fact-intensive issue. 
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into his potential claims before initiating the §220 Action.  
(Elkin Opening Br. at 27.)  Not only is this argument flatly 
inconsistent with the record, including evidence of Norman’s 
efforts to obtain information from Elkin following the Summer 
2002 Call, but it is legally meritless.  Elkin fails to cite a single 
case, and we are aware of none, involving a successful §220 
action in which a Delaware court has declined to grant tolling 
because of a “lack of inquiry.”  Nor are we aware of a case in 
which a Delaware court has even so much as suggested that 
such a concern is a relevant consideration in the §220-based 
tolling analysis.7  That is hardly surprising, given that “pursuit 
of an action under § 220 is regarded as strong evidence that [a] 
plaintiff was aggressively asserting its claims at that time[.]”  
Norman V, 860 F.3d at 124 (quotations omitted and first 
alteration in original).  The proper focus of a §220-based 
tolling analysis is the nature of the underlying §220 action and 
the results of it.  While a plaintiff’s conduct before filing a §220 
action may be significant for other purposes, such as 
determining inquiry notice or laches, there is no support for 
 
7  To the contrary, all of the cases to which Elkin directs 
us discuss a plaintiff’s level of inquiry in distinct contexts, such 
as determining whether they had inquiry notice of their claims 
or if their claims were barred by laches.  See, e.g., Technicorp 
Int’l II, Inc. v. Johnston, No. CIV.A. 15084, 2000 WL 713750, 
at *7 (Del. Ch. May 31, 2000) (holding plaintiff was not on 
inquiry notice of claims because it was unable to discover 
wrongdoing despite diligent investigation); Fike v. Ruger, 754 
A.2d 254, 262 (Del. Ch. 1999), aff’d, 752 A.2d 112 (Del. 2000) 
(claims barred by laches because plaintiff’s “lack of 
knowledge was due to his failure to exercise his right to obtain 
information,” including his right to inspect the company’s 
books and records).   
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Elkin’s assertion that it has any direct bearing on a §220-based 
tolling analysis itself. 
 
 Elkin’s third contention is that the District Court erred 
by failing to determine on a claim-by-claim basis whether 
§220-based tolling should apply.  Although the District Court 
did not specifically discuss each of Norman’s claims 
individually, for all intents and purposes its analysis achieved 
the same purpose.  The Court correctly recognized that there 
was a clear nexus between the §220 Action and each of 
Norman’s claims in this case, which Elkin does not, and 
cannot, credibly refute.  The Court similarly was right to note 
that Norman succeeded in the §220 Action.  According to the 
Stipulated Order and Final Judgment that resolved the §220 
Action, Norman secured, inter alia, access to 14 distinct 
categories of documents, each of which directly relates to at 
least one of his claims in this case.  Moreover, we have already 
recognized that what Norman obtained in the §220 Action was 
“valuable information” with respect to this litigation.  Norman 
V, 860 F.3d at 126.  Thus, given Norman’s broad success in the 
§220 Action and the obvious relationship between the §220 
Action and all of the claims asserted here, there was no need 
for the District Court to specifically address the factors 
favoring tolling on a claim-by-claim basis.  The same is true 
regarding any discussion of the factors weighing against 
tolling, such as whether the §220 Action was prosecuted in bad 
faith or for some other improper purpose, such as stalling to 
lengthen the limitations period.  Those inquiries, which look at 
the underlying §220 action as a whole, did not warrant a claim-
14 
 
by-claim analysis.  We therefore discern no error in the District 
Court’s approach.8  
 
 Fourth, Elkin contends that §220-based tolling was 
inappropriate for Norman’s claims because, several years 
before Norman initiated the §220 Action, there had been 
widely available public information regarding the license 
transfers around which his claims revolve.  To the extent that 
Elkin is arguing that inquiry notice forecloses §220-based 
tolling, we already rejected that argument in Norman V.  As we 
explained, the relevant issue is not whether Norman was on 
inquiry notice at all, but whether, if he was on such notice, that 
notice preceded his commencement of the §220 Action by 
more than the applicable limitations period.  To the extent that 
Elkin is arguing that Norman was not entitled to §220-based 
tolling because the §220 Action was not strictly necessary to 
bring his claims in light of the public information available to 
 
8  Elkin’s reliance on Orloff v. Shulman, No. CIV.A. 
852-N, 2005 WL 3272355, at *10 (Del. Ch. Nov. 23, 2005) is 
unavailing.  In Orloff, the court declined to toll the limitations 
period for certain claims, despite the fact that the plaintiffs had 
partially succeeded in a related §220 action, because the 
plaintiffs had at least inquiry notice of those claims for 
approximately 20 years before initiating their §220 action.  Far 
from holding that a successful §220 action does not support 
tolling the limitations period for all related claims, Orloff 
merely stands for the proposition that §220-based tolling 
cannot revive claims that already were untimely when the 
underlying §220 action was commenced.  That is in accord 
with, and in no way contrary to, our holding in Norman V and 
the District Court’s analysis on remand. 
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him, we largely rejected that argument too in Norman V.  Not 
only did we recognize that the inability to file suit without the 
benefit of a §220 action is not a “prerequisite[]” to §220-based 
tolling, we also noted that the §220 Action, at a minimum, 
actually enhanced Norman’s claims through the “valuable 
information” he secured.  Norman V, 860 F.3d at 125–26.  The 
District Court properly followed our guidance in Norman V by 
not treating Norman’s ability to bring suit absent the §220 
Action as a condition precedent to §220-based tolling and 
instead treating it as a factor to be balanced against other 
relevant considerations.9  See id. (“Delaware law preserves a 
court’s discretion to toll or not toll the limitations period on 
claims that may be informed by the results of a § 220 action…. 
Courts in our Circuit should proceed with due regard for the 
positive role that § 220 actions are meant to play under 
Delaware law.  That is especially true when, as in this case, a 
Delaware court has exercised its judgment and concluded that 
a § 220 action has merit.”). 
 
 We are also unpersuaded by Elkin’s final argument on 
this issue, that both we, in Norman V, and the District Court, in 
Norman VI, based our respective §220-based tolling 
 
9  For the same reasons, we reject Elkin’s argument that 
the District Court erred by not denying §220-based tolling 
given the absence of bad faith conduct or fraudulent 
concealment on his part.  Again, while such considerations 
may be relevant to the analysis, they are not prerequisites to 
§220-based tolling.  The District Court gave appropriate 
weight to the absence of bad faith by Elkin and acted well 
within its discretion in concluding that this absence did not 
outweigh the considerations strongly supporting §220-based 
tolling. 
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discussions on a misapprehension of the extent to which 
Norman succeeded in the §220 Action.  More specifically, 
Elkin argues that (1) our statements that the Court of Chancery 
“granted” Norman broad relief are not accurate, (2) that our 
reliance on the Vice Chancellor’s comments made at the end 
of the §220 Action were misplaced because they do not reflect 
his more recent view on the merits of that proceeding, and (3) 
that our decisions overstated the connection between the §220 
Action and this litigation.   
 
 Elkin’s first contention in this regard rests on hyper-
technical and ultimately incorrect semantics.  At the end of the 
§220 Action, the Vice Chancellor stated that he was “inclined 
to … grant[] the 220 relief in pretty broad form[,]” Norman v. 
US MobilComm, Inc., No. CIV.A. 849-N, 2006 WL 1229115, 
at *2 (Del. Ch. Apr. 28, 2006) (“US MobilComm”), but he gave 
the parties the opportunity to reach their own agreement based 
on that guidance before formally ruling on the matter.  The 
parties did reach such an agreement, in the form of a Stipulated 
Order and Final Judgment, which provided Norman with broad 
relief.  More significantly, the Stipulated Order and Final 
Judgment, as the name suggests, was the Court of Chancery’s 
judgment resolving the §220 Action and was formally 
approved and entered by the Vice Chancellor.  Accordingly, 
and contrary to Elkin’s assertion otherwise, it is evident that 
the Court of Chancery did, in fact, “grant” Norman broad relief 
in connection with the §220 Action.  It is of no moment that 
what Norman received in the §220 Action was negotiated by 
the parties based on the Vice Chancellor’s clear guidance that 
Norman should obtain broad relief and was not unilaterally 
imposed by the Vice Chancellor.  
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 Likewise meritless is Elkin’s assertion that the view the 
Vice Chancellor expressed about the merits of Norman’s 
claims at the conclusion of the trial in the §220 Action was later 
undermined or superseded.  In support of his position, Elkin 
relies on cherry-picked statements from an April 2006 decision 
by the Vice Chancellor addressing the entirely distinct question 
of whether Norman was entitled to an award of attorneys’ fees 
for successfully prosecuting the §220 Action.  The answer to 
that question turned on whether Norman had a “clear right” to 
the documents he sought in the §220 Action or whether USM 
had acted in bad faith in opposing Norman in that proceeding.  
Id. at *2-5.  Neither of those issues has anything to do with the 
Vice Chancellor’s post-trial view that the §220 Action was 
meritorious.  Yet, insofar as the Vice Chancellor discussed that 
view in the April 2006 opinion, he unambiguously reiterated it.  
See id. at *1 (“At the end of a one-day trial, I stated that I was 
inclined to rule in Norman’s favor and grant broad relief[.]”); 
id. at *2 (“At the end of trial I did not issue a ruling, but advised 
the parties that ‘I’m very much inclined to be granting the 220 
relief in pretty broad form.’”); id. (“[T]he parties do not dispute 
that Norman prevailed in the litigation[.]”); id. at *4 
(“Although I ultimately concluded Norman had a proper 
purpose, I did not reach a firm decision on that issue until after 
I heard the evidence at trial.”).  
 
 Finally, the connection between the §220 Action and 
this litigation has not been overstated.  Elkin’s assertion that 
there are “blatantly false allegations in the Amended 220 
Complaint that bear no connection to the allegations in this 
litigation” is both conclusory and irrelevant.  (Elkin Opening 
Br. at 45.)  Even assuming that some allegations in the §220 
Action do not bear a relationship to this litigation, it is beyond 
dispute that a great many of them are directly related.  
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Moreover, the categories of information Norman secured 
access to through the §220 Action have an obvious and strong 
nexus to Norman’s claims here.  Elkin has failed to argue or 
explain how any, let alone a meaningful percentage, of the 
relief that Norman obtained in the §220 Action is unrelated to 
at least one of Norman’s various causes of action.  In short, 
Elkin’s various attempts to blunt the impact of the §220 Action 
on the tolling analysis fail in their entirety.     
 
2. Purported evidence of Norman’s bad 
 faith in the §220 Action 
  
 Similarly unavailing is Elkin’s assertion that, on remand 
from Norman V, the District Court wrongfully refused to allow 
him to present evidence that Norman pursued the §220 Action 
in bad faith.  That argument rests of the incorrect premise that 
“[t]he issue of Norman’s bad faith in pursuing the 220 Action 
was never an issue in this litigation until this Court made it part 
of the tolling calculus in Norman V.”  (Elkin Opening Br. at 
47.)  We did not create new law in Norman V merely by 
acknowledging that Delaware courts have recognized that 
“deceitful, bad faith conduct[]” is relevant to determining 
whether fact-gathering litigation, such as the §220 Action, can 
provide a basis for tolling.  Norman V, 860 F.3d at 125 (quoting 
Technicorp Int’l II, Inc. v. Johnston, No. CIV.A. 15084, 2000 
WL 713750, at *7 (Del. Ch. May 31, 2000)).10  That long-
 
10  Although Technicorp discussed “bad faith” conduct 
by the defendant corporation resisting a fact-gathering 
proceeding, rather than by the stockholder plaintiff, nothing in 
Technicorp suggests that bad faith conduct is significant only 
when it proceeds from the defendant.  
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standing principle was available to Elkin throughout this 
litigation, including when the District Court first addressed 
Norman’s argument that the §220 Action tolled the statute of 
limitations for his claims.  See Norman II, 726 F. Supp. 2d at 
472 (citing Technicorp).  Elkin could have and should have 
raised the issue long before we decided Norman V, if he 
thought it had any merit.  The District Court did not abuse its 
discretion in refusing to allow Elkin to further prolong an 
already protracted litigation by belatedly raising a new issue 
and offering new evidence in support of it, despite having had 
ample prior opportunity to do so.11  Elkin’s arguments on 
appeal are all unpersuasive. 
 
 
11  Assuming Norman V did create new law, which it did 
not, the District Court still did not abuse its discretion in 
excluding Elkin’s late-offered evidence.  That is because Elkin 
only presented that evidence to the Court for the first time at a 
hearing on the parties’ motions for reargument.  At a minimum, 
if Elkin wished to pursue the argument that Norman undertook 
the §220 Action in bad faith, it was incumbent on him to raise 
that argument and provide supporting evidence from the outset 
of the remand proceedings.  Having made the strategic choice 
only to raise the bad faith argument for the first time in 
connection with a motion for reargument, Elkin cannot 
complain that the District Court acted outside of its discretion 
in refusing to allow him to surprise the Court (and Norman) 
with new evidence produced at the last minute. 
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B. Norman’s Appeal  
 
1. Contract-based claims 
 
Norman first argues that the District Court erred in 
concluding that the statute of limitations for his distribution-
based breach of contract claim began to run at the time of each 
distribution and not in May 2002 when the distributions were 
completed, because the distributions were severable, rather 
than continuous violations.  We disagree.  Under Delaware 
law, “[t]he continuing breach doctrine is ‘narrow’ and 
‘typically is applied only in unusual situations.’”  AM Gen. 
Holdings LLC v. The Renco Grp., Inc., No. 7639-VCS, 2016 
WL 4440476, at *11 (Del. Ch. Aug. 22, 2016) (quoting 
Desimone v. Barrows, 924 A.2d 908, 924–25 (Del. Ch. 2007)).  
Generally speaking, if a “plaintiff could have alleged a prima 
facie case for breach of contract ... after a single incident[,]” 
then the “continuing breach doctrine does not apply even when 
confronted with numerous repeated wrongs of similar, if not 
same, character over an extended period.”  Id. at *12 (internal 
quotation marks and citations omitted).   
 
 Norman’s breach of contract claim does not present an 
“unusual situation.”  Each individual distribution Elkin made 
to himself constituted, at least in theory, a discrete and readily 
determinable violation of Norman’s rights as a 25% equity-
holder in USM.  Nevertheless, Norman contends that he has 
asserted an overarching and continuous breach because his 
damages from each individual distribution were “inherent[ly] 
contingen[t]” on the SLA being invalidated and could not be 
calculated until that time.  (Norman Answering Br. at 50-51.)  
That argument, however, ignores that, as Norman himself 
asserts in his Amended Complaint, the SLA’s validity and 
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Elkin’s purported failure to make proper distributions could be, 
and were, adjudicated simultaneously.  The lone authority 
Norman now cites in support of his position, Branin v. Stein 
Roe Investment Counsel, LLC, No. CV 8481-VCN, 2015 WL 
4710321 (Del. Ch. July 31, 2015), is readily distinguishable.  
In Branin, an employee sought to enforce a contractual right to 
indemnification against his current employer for expenses he 
incurred in defending against a lawsuit by his former employer.  
Because the employee “could not have enforced his 
indemnification right until the nature of his conduct underlying 
the [former employer’s lawsuit] was established[,]” “the 
statute of limitations on [the employee]’s indemnification 
claim did not begin to run until the underlying litigation was 
resolved[,]” because it would have been “inefficient” to require 
the employee to sue continually before that resolution.  Id. at 
*4, 7.  Here, there was no prior, independent litigation that 
needed to be resolved before Norman could bring a breach of 
contract claim.  Nor are there comparable “efficiency” 
considerations.  The question of the SLA’s validity arose in 
connection with Elkin’s defense to Norman’s breach of 
contract claim, not as a condition precedent to the claim.  We 
reject Norman’s unsupported attempt to dramatically expand 
the “narrow” continuous breach doctrine such that it reaches 
defenses to claims rather than true contingencies. 
 
 We do, however, agree with Norman’s second assertion 
regarding his breach of contract claim: events that occurred 
prior to the May, July, and August 2001 distributions did not 
provide him with inquiry notice of his claim pertaining to those 
distributions.  Even assuming the public records regarding the 
license transfers and the 2000 Form K-1 that Norman received 
should have prompted him to inquire further into what was 
happening at USM, a reasonable inquiry would not have led 
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him to the discovery of his injury, i.e., distributions in breach 
of his agreement with Elkin.  Rather, based on the facts as 
found by the jury, he would have learned that Elkin was 
repaying himself the excess capital he had contributed, which 
was not a violation of the agreement.  Elkin cites nothing in the 
record that transpired or could have come to light between such 
an investigation and November 2001, the outside limitations 
date for Norman’s breach of contract claim,12 that should have 
prompted Norman to investigate further, and would have led to 
the discovery of the violative distributions.   
 
For that same reason, Elkin’s argument that it is not 
appropriate to simply disregard what Norman knew or should 
have known prior to the date of his injury for inquiry notice 
purposes misses the mark.  Assuming the correctness of 
Elkin’s dubious premise that one can be on inquiry notice of 
an injury that has not yet occurred, his argument nevertheless 
does not hold water because it fails to account for the fact that, 
at least in this case, reasonable inquiry into facts known to him 
before his injury would have led to Norman discovering 
conduct – the repayment of loans – that did not violate his right 
 
12   Because the District Court concluded that the statute 
of limitations for Norman’s claims was tolled from November 
2004 (when Norman commenced the §220 Action) through his 
filing of this lawsuit, and because Norman’s breach of contract 
claim has a three-year limitations period, the District Court 
viewed the operative question in determining whether 
Norman’s breach of contract claim was time-barred as being 
whether he had at least inquiry notice of that claim before 
November 2001, i.e., three years before the start of the §220 
Action.  Norman VI, 338 F. Supp. 3d at 375.  We agree with 
that approach.    
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to a pro rata share of USM’s distributions.  And that discovery 
would have terminated Norman’s obligation to inquire further 
on that issue absent new information.  Accordingly, we will 
reverse the District Court’s dismissal of Norman’s distribution-
based breach of contract claim based on the May, July, and 
August 2001 distributions, and will remand for the Court to 
restore in full the second jury’s $73,180.17 compensatory 
damages award for Norman’s distribution-based breach of 
contract claim.13    
 
2. Non-contract claims 
 
Norman contends that the District Court erred in 
dismissing his conversion and breach of fiduciary duty claims 
as untimely.  Regarding his conversion claim, Norman argues 
that the District Court erred in concluding that claim accrued 
when Elkin registered TEG as the applicant or owner of the 
Phase II licenses, and not in 2000 and 2001 when “USM was 
damaged by the failure of Elkin to deposit the Phase II license 
sale proceeds into USM,” because that was the point at which 
TEG’s control over the licenses was “unauthorized.”  (Norman 
Answering Br. at 58-59; see also Norman VI, 338 F.Supp.3d at 
376.)  Norman’s position before us, however, is irreconcilable 
with the conversion claim he actually tried to the jury, which 
was clearly based on the theory that TEG’s initial procurement 
of the Phase II licenses was unauthorized.  (See JA 725 (verdict 
question for Norman’s “Conversion and Misappropriation 
Claim” stating “Do you find … that … Elkin misappropriated 
[USM]’s good will or status as a qualified bidder and 
 
13   Per our conclusion herein, we leave to the District 
Court any recalculation of interest included in the judgment, as 
necessitated by that restoration. 
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incumbent license holder with the Federal Communications 
Commission during the 220 MHz Auction Number 18?”); JA 
719 (jury instructions for Norman’s conversion claim 
explaining elements as “1. [USM] possessed the status as a 
qualified bidder and incumbent license holder before the 
Federal Communications Commission; 2. [Elkin] or [TEG] 
exercised control over that status; 3. The exercise of the control 
was unauthorized; 4. [USM] was harmed as a result of the 
conduct.”)).  We find no error in the District Court’s 
determination that Norman had inquiry notice of TEG’s 
“unauthorized” procurement of Phase II licenses before 
November 2002, the outside limitations date for his non-
contract claims.14  That inquiry notice was a product of the 
numerous public disclosures regarding TEG’s procurement of 
Phase II licenses, Norman’s close monitoring of the Phase II 
auction, his failure to follow up with Elkin after Elkin declined 
to provide him requested information about the auction results, 
and Elkin’s disclosure during the Summer 2002 Call that 
licenses had been sold and distributions made.  Any of those 
events should have prompted Norman to inquire further, and 
reasonable inquiry would have led to the discovery that TEG 
had procured Phase II licenses at USM’s expense.  
Accordingly, the District Court properly dismissed Norman’s 
conversion claim as untimely.   
 
 
14   The District Court’s analysis of the timeliness of 
Norman’s non-contract claims was similar to its analysis of his 
contract claim, except November 2002, two years before the 
§220 Action was filed, was the key date because of the two-
year statute of limitations for those claims.  Norman VI, 338 F. 
Supp. 3d at 377-78.  We again agree with the framework the 
District Court utilized to decide the timeliness issue. 
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 Importantly, even if Norman was correct that his 
conversion claim did not accrue until 2000 or perhaps 2001, 
that claim’s disposition would remain unchanged.  The 
evidence in this case shows that the Summer 2002 Call alone 
placed Norman on inquiry notice.  That call, during which 
Elkin was “evasive” and made the clearly disturbing statement 
that Norman did not receive any distribution from USM’s asset 
divestitures because it was not “his turn,” correctly prompted 
Norman to investigate further and seek additional 
information.15  In the case of Norman’s conversion claim, we 
need not even infer what discoveries a reasonable investigation 
would have yielded.  The record shows Norman’s straight-
forward request for more information in fact led to, among 
other things, the December 2002 Letter, which identified TEG 
as the holder of Phase II licenses that he believed belonged to 
USM.  Therefore, Norman had inquiry notice of his conversion 
claim by November 2002 because evidence of TEG’s alleged 
wrongdoing could have been discovered, and was in fact 
discovered, through a reasonable investigation of the 
suspicious distributions that he actually became aware of 
during the Summer 2002 Call.16  See U.S. Cellular Inv. Co. of 
Allentown v. Bell Atl. Mobile Sys., Inc., 677 A.2d 497, 503 n.7 
 
15   Of course, Elkin’s initial failure to respond to this 
request only heightened the need for investigation, as 
demonstrated by the fact that the failure galvanized Norman to 
seek the assistance of counsel. 
 
16  To be clear, we are not holding that the source of 
Norman’s inquiry notice was the December 2002 Letter.  
Rather, we cite that communication as compelling evidence of 
what discoveries a reasonable inquiry initiated  in response to 
the Summer 2002 Call would and did yield. 
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(Del. 1996) (“[T]he federal doctrine means limitation and 
laches does not begin to run until evidence of [the alleged 
wrong] is discovered or could have been discovered had 
reasonable diligence been exercised, for whatever is notice 
calling for inquiry is notice of everything to which such inquiry 
might have led.”) (quoting Tobacco & Allied Stocks, Inc. v. 
Transamerica Corp., 143 F. Supp. 323, 328–29 (D. Del. 
1956)). 
 
 As to his breach of fiduciary duty claim based on the 
execution of the SLA, Norman says the District Court was 
wrong to conclude the claim was time-barred, given both our 
holding in Norman V reinstating his SLA-based breach of 
contract claim and the Court’s reliance on USM’s financial 
information from 1998.  First, as already noted, Elkin failed to 
challenge the timeliness of Norman’s SLA-based breach of 
contract claim.  Thus, the fact that judgment was entered in 
Norman’s favor on that claim says nothing about the timeliness 
of his SLA-based breach of fiduciary duty claim.  Second, even 
if we agreed with Norman that our holding in Norman V 
somehow forecloses the possibility that he had inquiry notice 
of his SLA-related claims in 1998, it is evident that the Summer 
2002 Call provided such notice.  Elkin’s statement during the 
call that it was not Norman’s “turn” to participate in the 
Company’s distributions undoubtedly should have prompted 
Norman, USM’s only other stockholder, to investigate the 
Company’s capital structure and understand the basis for that 
statement.  And, in fact, he did.  The October 2002 Letter 
specifically sought information “about the sale or other 
disposition” of any USM stock or assets over the prior three 
years, and the uses of any proceeds from those sales, which led 
to Norman receiving a copy of the SLA in October 2003 and 
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notice that stockholder loans were being repaid.17  Norman VI, 
338 F. Supp. 3d at 370.  Accordingly, and exactly as with his 
conversion claim, Norman had inquiry notice of his SLA 
breach of fiduciary duty claim by November 2002 because 
Elkin’s alleged breach could have been discovered, and was in 
fact discovered, through a reasonable investigation of the 
troubling statements Elkin made during the Summer 2002 
Call.18   
 
 
17   Again, to be clear, we are not holding that the source 
of Norman’s inquiry notice was the October 2003 Letter.  We 
rely on that letter only as evidence of what discoveries a 
reasonable inquiry initiated in response to the Summer 2002 
Call would have yielded. 
 
18  Norman argues that we should essentially ignore the 
Summer 2002 Call because certain statements made by Elkin 
in his briefing “are an explicit withdraw [sic] or waiver of his 
past arguments that the Summer 2002 Call could have provided 
Norman with notice of certain claims.”  (Norman Reply Br. at 
5.)  Read in their proper context, however, it is clear that 
Elkin’s statements regarding his lack of reliance on the 
Summer 2002 Call to demonstrate Norman’s inquiry notice 
pertain only to Norman’s breach of contract claim.  That is 
unsurprising, given those claims have a three-year limitations 
period and the Summer 2002 Call occurred less than three 
years before Norman initiated the §220 Action.  Elkin did not, 
sua sponte, abandon the most compelling – and largely 
dispositive – evidence in the record on the question of when 
Norman had inquiry notice of his non-contract claims. 
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 Third, Norman asserts that the District Court applied the 
wrong standard to assess inquiry notice, based on the Court’s 
statement that Norman knew “enough to put him on notice of 
the need to undertake further inquiry to determine if Elkin had 
wronged him.”  (Norman Answering Br. at 60 (quoting 
Norman VI, 338 F. Supp. 3d at 375).)  According to Norman, 
the correct standard “is whether the allegedly notice-providing 
evidence would objectively lead to the discovery of Norman’s 
actual injury.”  (Id. at 61.)  But that argument ignores that the 
standard the District Court actually applied throughout its 
opinions is exactly the standard Norman advocates.  A mere 
one sentence later than the language Norman criticizes, the 
Court held that “[i]f Norman had [undertaken further inquiry], 
he would have discovered Elkin’s allegedly improper 
distributions.” Norman VI, 338 F. Supp. 3d at 375.  Thus, it is 
clear that the District Court considered it significant that 
Norman knew enough information to warrant further 
investigation, not for its own sake, but because such further 
investigation would have led to the discovery of Norman’s 
actual injury.  That analysis, which the Court utilized 
throughout its opinion,19 applies the correct standard.  See 
Pomeranz v. Museum Partners, L.P., No. CIV. A. 20211, 2005 
WL 217039, at *3 (Del. Ch. Jan. 24, 2005) (“Inquiry notice 
does not require full knowledge of the material facts; rather, 
plaintiffs are on inquiry notice when they have sufficient 
knowledge to raise their suspicions to the point where persons 
 
19   See, e.g., Norman VI, 338 F. Supp. 3d at 377 
(conversion claim time-barred because reasonable 
investigation would have led to discovery of the injury); id. at 
379 (same regarding SLA-based breach of fiduciary duty 
claim). 
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of ordinary intelligence and prudence would commence an 
investigation that, if pursued would lead to the discovery of the 
injury.”).20  Norman’s position to the contrary is meritless. 
 
 Finally, Norman says that the District Court did not 
properly consider the so-called “smoking gun” standard 
applicable to determining inquiry notice for claims involving 
fiduciaries.  That argument also is unpersuasive.  We have 
previously recognized that, under Pennsylvania law, “the 
existence of a fiduciary relationship is relevant to a discovery 
rule analysis precisely because it entails such a presumptive 
level of trust in the fiduciary by the principal that it may take a 
‘smoking gun’ to excite searching inquiry on the principal’s 
part into its fiduciary's behavior.”  In re Mushroom Transp. 
Co., 382 F.3d 325, 343 (3d Cir. 2004).  Assuming Elkin had 
the burden of producing a “smoking gun” that should have 
prompted Norman to inquire into potential wrongdoing, we are 
satisfied he carried that burden here.  By Norman’s own 
account, Elkin was “evasive” during the Summer 2002 Call, 
which itself should have greatly troubled him, especially since 
the reason he reached out to Elkin in the first place was that he 
had not heard from him “in ages.”  (Norman Answering Br. at 
13; JA 860.)  The substance of the call, in which Elkin 
 
20   The District Court determined long ago that 
Norman’s non-contract claims were governed by Pennsylvania 
law.  Norman I, 2007 WL 2822798, at *4.  But both the District 
Court’s analysis and the parties’ briefing often rely on 
Delaware case law.  Given the absence of any argument from 
the parties that Delaware and Pennsylvania law have 
meaningfully different definitions of inquiry notice, we will 
follow their lead and assume, without deciding, that the two 
laws are comparable in that regard. 
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acknowledged that licenses had been sold and that he alone had 
taken distributions, without any direct notice to Norman, 
should have been at least equally alarming, particularly given 
Norman’s own admission that Elkin had a “checkered” history 
in dealing with him.  (Norman Answering Br. at 61.)  Indeed, 
there was no readily apparent reason that Norman, who 
understood himself to be one of only two stockholders holding 
the same class of common stock as Elkin, would need to wait 
for “his turn” to receive a distribution.21  And if that were not 
enough, Norman simply ignores that he, in fact, was 
sufficiently disturbed by the Summer 2002 Call that it 
prompted him to investigate further.22  Therefore, at a 
minimum, the conclusion that the Summer 2002 Call placed 
Noman on inquiry notice is consistent with Pennsylvania’s 
“smoking gun” standard.  Because the Summer 2002 Call 
placed Norman on inquiry notice of all of his non-contract 
 
21   Norman makes much of the fact that any Form K-
1’s he received did not identify that USM had any stockholder 
loans.  However, the omission of any stockholder loans from 
USM’s Form K-1’s, whether deliberate or inadvertent, should 
only have served to heighten Norman’s suspicions as to why 
he was not receiving any distributions given the apparent lack 
of more senior securities in USM’s capital structure. 
 
22   Elkin’s ignoring Norman’s well-founded requests 
for additional information to the point that Norman felt it 
necessary to enlist the assistance of counsel only underscores 
how patently unreasonable it would have been for him to 
continue to rely on the fiduciary nature of his relationship with 
Elkin as a justification for not investigating Elkin’s potential 
wrongdoing. 
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claims,23 the District Court properly dismissed them as barred 
by the statute of limitations. 
 
III. CONCLUSION 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we will reverse the District 
Court’s dismissal of Norman’s distribution-based breach of 
contract claim for the distributions that occurred in May, July, 
and August of 2001.  In all other respects, we will affirm the 
District Court’s final order.  Accordingly, we will remand this 
case to the District Court for the limited purpose of entering a 
further revised final judgment, which revisions to the District 
Court’s Revised Final Judgement in a Civil Case dated May 7, 
2019 shall be: (i) recalculating the damages amounts specified 
in the first paragraph and paragraph 1(b) to reflect Norman’s 
prevailing on his breach of contract claim based on Elkin’s 
failure to make pro rata distributions in May, July, and August 
2001; (ii) otherwise revising paragraphs 1(b) and 2(a) to reflect 
Norman’s prevailing on his breach of contract claim based on 
Elkin’s failure to make pro rata distributions in May, July, and 
August 2001; and (iii) identifying the proper rate of post-
judgment interest. 
 
23   This includes Norman’s claims for usurpation of 
corporate opportunities, breach of the duty of disclosure, unjust 
enrichment, and declaratory judgment. 
